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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 
AND UNIVERSITIES ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDICINES  
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) is an international nonprofit 
organization that searches for better outcomes and new solutions to management of 
knowledge resources, particularly in the context of social justice.  KEI is drawn to 
areas where current business models and practices fail to adequately address social 
needs or where there are opportunities for substantial improvements.  Among other 
areas, KEI has expertise in access to medicines and medical technologies. 
 KEI has concerns about the impacts of the present case because of the far-
reaching consequences for the future of innovation, patent law and public health.  
As an advocate of new incentives and financing models for innovation, and the 
proponent of mechanisms for stimulating investments and promoting innovation 
outside the patent regime, KEI encourages the Federal Circuit to fully consider the 
alternatives, particularly in cases where patent rewards may not be appropriate. 
 Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (“UAEM”) is an international 
nonprofit organization for university students advocating increased innovation and 
access to medicines and other health-related technologies.  UAEM works to 
promote affordable global access to essential medicines developed from university 
research.  More than one quarter of all gene patents are assigned to universities, 
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and nearly two thirds of all gene patents are the result of publicly funded research.  
(A168, 14565.)  Accordingly, UAEM is particularly concerned with the negative 
impact of gene patents on the public’s ability to afford and utilize essential medical 
diagnostics and treatments for widespread disease prevention. 
AUTHORITY TO FILE 
Pursuant to paragraph four (4) of this Court’s order, dated April 30, 2012, 
stating that briefs of amici curiae may be filed without consent and leave of court, 
amici file this brief.  This brief is limited to fifteen (15) pages and otherwise 
complies with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 and Federal Circuit Rule 29.   
Neither KEI nor UAEM has any commercial interest in the parties to this 
action.  No part of this brief was authored by a party’s counsel nor did any party or 
a party’s counsel contribute money that was intended to fund preparation or 
submission of this brief.  No person, other than the amici curiae, KEI and UAEM, 
contributed money to the preparation and submission of this brief 
INTRODUCTION 
Patents-at-issue involve two human gene sequences, known as BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, which play a critical role in determining susceptibility to breast cancer.  
Patents-at-issue are based on federally funded research conducted at the University 
of Utah (“UT”).  UT obtained ownership over the patents-in-suit by exercising its 
rights under the Bayh-Dole Act.   
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Exclusive licensee, Myriad Genetics, prevented others from developing 
additional genetic testing.  Defendants-Appellants also prohibited independent 
verification of the accuracy of its tests, despite known failure rates, and used their 
monopoly to stifle further research on the genes, including for specific mutations 
more prevalent in minorities.  As the exclusive rights holder, Defendants-
Appellants can therefore block patient access to better testing and second-opinions. 
Isolated DNA represents products of nature and should not receive patent 
protection.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  The process of 
isolation relies on application of well-understood scientific principles.  Even where 
a gene’s entire function has not yet been discovered, patents remove the gene from 
the public domain, hindering research that depends on collective understanding.  
DNA patents create exclusive rights with unknown breadth, impeding new 
discoveries.  As a result, patents on DNA have a “blocking” effect and represents 
“unnecessary toll booths on the road to discovery.”  Alan E. Guttmacher, et. al, 
Genomic Medicine—A Primer, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1514 (2002). 
KEI and UAEM believe that the patents-in-suit contravene the constitutional 
rationale of the patent system and the Defendant-Appellants’ monopoly over the 
BRCA1/2 genes have, in fact, led to a decrease in information concerning these 
genes and impeded the progress of science.   In light of the foregoing facts, KEI 
and UAEM file as amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.  
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I. THE GOAL OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IS TO ENCOURAGE 
PROGRESS AND EXCLUDES PRODUCTS OF NATURE, LAWS OF 
NATURE, NATURAL PHENOMENA AND ABSTRACT IDEAS. 
 
The Constitution sets forth the rationale to create laws permitting inventors 
to have a limited monopoly: to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”  
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  While the Patent Act creates a quid-pro-quo for the 
purpose of advancing scientific progress, the “embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent” is justified only because such monopolies serve the “benefit of society.” 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).  
Congress has wide latitude in creating patent laws, but it “may not overreach 
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purposes.” John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. at 6.  The Constitution serves as a grant of power, but also a limitation: “This 
qualified authority . . . is limited to promotion of advances in the useful arts.”  Id. 
at 5.  Congress cannot permit patents that “remove existent knowledge from the 
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.” Id. at 5.   
The Court recently reaffirmed this limitation in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (slip op.).  See infra Part I.C. 
In light of the Prometheus decision, past precedent, and the constitutional 
rationale for the patent system, the lower court decision should be affirmed.  
Patents-in-suit, as basic tools of scientific work, represent products of nature and 
are not patent eligible.   
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A. Products of Nature, Laws of Nature and Natural Phenomena, 
Such as the Claims-At-Issue Are Not Patent-Eligible Under 
Section 101 of the Patent Act 
 
In applying Section 101 of the Patent Act, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held three specific types of claims as categorically removed from patent eligibility 
including “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).  See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
185 (1981); Funk Bros. Seeds Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).  The Supreme 
Court has provided the following factors for patent eligibility in line with these 
exclusions and a product may not be patented where it: (1) is the direct product of 
natural law; (2) is not markedly different from a naturally occurring form; or (3) 
preempts all uses of a natural product.  See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Funk 
Bros, 333 U.S. at 130-32 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972). 
Within this framework, courts have explicitly excluded a number of specific 
products from patentability including wood pulp and paper pulp, Am. Wood Paper 
v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566 (1874), purified uranium, In re Marden, 
47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931), purified vanadium, In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958 
(1931), purified tungsten, Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d 
Cir. 1928), and vitamin C purified from lemon juice, In re King, 107 F 2d 618 
(C.C.P.A. 1939).  Naturally occurring substances and those identified solely 
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through purification have been excluded from patentability.  Such substances, even 
when remixed or artificially created, do not fall under the scope of patent eligibility 
 In the present case, Defendants-Appellants claim protection for purified or 
isolated DNA, but the extraction does not change its character as a product of 
nature.  The contention that the claims-at-issue exhibit useful properties does not 
negate the fact that these nucleic acids are not markedly different from those found 
in nature.  Mere breaking of covalent bonds to isolate the BRCA1/2 genes does not 
change the nature of the DNA.  The limitation of our patent system is necessary to 
ensure that the purpose of the patent regime is fulfilled, that is to promote the 
progress of science and prohibit roadblocks to future research and development.   
B. Where Patent Protection Improperly Preempts All Other Uses, 
Progress of Science Is Hindered 
 
In addition to excluding products of nature, natural phenomena and abstract 
ideas, the Supreme Court has held that patents may not be granted where the effect 
would be “to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 
(1966).  Preemption is an important factor in determining the scope of patentability 
under Section 101 of the Patent Act, see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) 
and complete field preemption is evidence of a patent claim that has been drawn on 
ineligible subject matter.  See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Corning v. 
Burden, 94 U.S. 780 (1854); but see Diamond v. Diehr, 50 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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Monopolies preventing all others from creating the same effect or process by 
any other means forecloses all other uses and demonstrates complete field 
preemption.  Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853).  Such foreclosure 
discourages scientific progress and contravenes the very policy of the Patent Act 
and constitutional rationale for our intellectual property system.  See id. at 175.   
 The patents-in-suit completely preempt the use of the patents in the field of 
genetic testing and identification, therefore evidencing claims drawn on ineligible 
subject matter.  Patent protection over the BRCA1/2 genes completely forecloses 
and preempts all other uses.  DNA patents are difficult, if not impossible, to invent 
around.  See Isabelle Huys, et. al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic 
Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 907 (2009).  The BRCA1/2 
patents thus completely foreclose research on any effects of these DNA sequences 
and scientists cannot conduct research on the naturally occurring gene. 
 Additionally, patents-in-suit preempt development of new BRCA1/2 related 
genetic tests as well as tests for those not directly related to BRCA1/2 sequences.  
Thomas B. Kepler, et. al., Metastatasizing patent claims on BRCA1, GENOMICS 
(May 2010), available at http://www.elsevier.com/framework_products/Promis_ 
misc/kepler_crossman_cook.deegan.pdf.  The broad description of the claims-at-
issue could give Defendant-Appellants control over diagnostic testing on diseases 
for which they performed no research or work. 
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C. Mayo v. Prometheus Reaffirms Prior Case Law Regarding 
Exclusions from Patentability and Emphasizes the Importance of 
Considering Implications for Further Innovation 
 
In its recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “long held” exclusions of the 
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas from patent eligibility. 566 
U.S. __ (2012) (slip op. at 1) (citations omitted).  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
reminds, quoting its previous decisions, that “‘a new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter . . . Such 
discoveries are ‘manifestations of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none.’”  Prometheus at 1 (citing Chakrabarty at 309 (quoting Funk Brothers 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
In refusing to permit patents on those discoveries, the Court notes their 
status as “basic tools of scientific and technological work” and monopolization of 
such tools “might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote 
it.”  Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. __ (2012) (slip op. at 2) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Citing Benson, Bilski and Flook, the Court noted that permitting patents 
on natural laws or “basic tools” run the  
danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future 
innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a 
patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to ‘apply 
the natural law,’ or otherwise forecloses more future invention than 
the underlying discovery could reasonably justify.  Id. at 17 (internal 
citations omitted). 
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The Court further suggests that the presence of the concern “these patents tie up 
too much future use of laws of nature simply reinforces our conclusion that the 
processes described in the patents are not patent eligible.” Id. at 18.   
 Isolation of DNA involves well-understood and routine activity by 
researchers and the DNA itself represents a product of nature.  The Supreme Court 
noted that the patents in Prometheus involved routine activity and permitting 
patents “would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural 
laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries.”  566 U.S. __ (2012) 
(slip op. at 4).  The Court “has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law 
not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of 
nature.”   Id.  DNA represents the essence of a natural product and its functions 
represent the laws of nature.  Although Prometheus involved method patents, the 
reasoning is relevant and supports affirmance of the denial of patents-at-issue. 
II. NON-PATENT MECHANISMS CAN AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE 
PROGRESS WHERE PATENTS ARE AN INAPPROPRIATE, 
UNNECESSARY, INSUFFICIENT, OR BURDENSOME REWARD 
 
 The most common and superficially appealing justifications for liberal 
standards on patentability are those that assert, without evidence, that patents are 
necessary to protect and reward investments for new products.  This false argument 
is belied both by known shortcomings of patents as incentives, and growing 
proliferation of non-patents mechanisms to stimulate research and development.  
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 In certain areas of innovation, patents do not provide adequate incentives 
and other mechanisms to reward innovation are needed.  Also, with respect to the 
claims-at-issue, patent protection can effectively block further research and 
development, and discourage investments.   
 A report by an advisory committee of the Department of Health and Human 
Services concluded gene patents were not necessary to provide incentives for 
research or development of clinical testing.   Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 
Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. On Genetics, Health, and Soc’y, Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access (2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf.  This 
report noted that gene patents harmed patient access to genetic testing and denied 
quality assurance tests. Id.  Because patents provide a burdensome incentive in the 
case of isolated-DNA or human genes, other mechanisms should be explored. 
 A wide range of non-patent incentives exist to encourage research and 
discovery.  Mechanisms to protect, reward and induce investment into innovation 
across broad sectors often take the place of patent incentives.
1
  Great flexibility 
exists to design these alternative forms of incentive outside of the patent system. 
                                                
1
 Although several alternative incentive mechanisms are discussed herein, amici do 
not necessarily endorse each of these alternatives, particularly in the manner in 
which some have been implemented.  This discussion of alternatives serves as 
examples of the great range of incentives that currently exist outside of the patent 
system or those that have been proposed. 
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Trade secret protection, for example, while having their own shortcomings 
in terms of limiting access to knowledge, are used to promote investments in new 
medical products, including for medical diagnostic and biotechnology drugs.  Iraj 
Daizadeh, et. al., A general approach for determining when to patent, publish, or 
protect information as a trade secret, 20 NAT. BIOTECH at 1053-54 (2002).  
 Furthermore, there exist a wide range of new sui generis forms of 
intellectual property used in parallel to the patent system, often when patents are 
unavailable.  One type of sui generis protection that has become quite common is 
the application of time limited exclusive rights to rely upon test data used to 
register new drugs or vaccines.  Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, New Drugs, 21 
U.S.C. §355.  These rights include 5 years of test data protection for new chemical 
entity pharmaceutical products, and 12 years of test data protection for new 
biologic drugs.  Id.  Like trade secrets, exclusive rights over test data for 
pharmaceuticals may have their own shortcomings, including ethical concerns, but 
presently serve as a mechanism to promote investments in clinical test data.  
Another non-patent right is the marketing exclusivity granted for the development 
of new “orphan” drug indications, or to reward investments in clinical trials for 
pediatric patents.  Internal Revenue Code, Clinical testing expenses for certain 
drugs for rare diseases or conditions, 26 U.S.C. §45C.   The U.S. Government 
gives a 50 percent tax credit for investments in clinical trials for orphan drugs, and 
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Congress is considering legislation to grant 5 years of market exclusivity for new 
antibiotic drugs, that would work as a supplement to or independent of patent 
protection.  Id.  To simulate R&D in treatments for rare tropical diseases, Congress 
has created a “Priority Review Voucher,” providing for a transferable right to an 
accelerated consideration of new drug approvals as a reward for registering drugs 
for treatments like cholera or leprosy.  Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Priority 
Review to Encourage Treatments for Tropical Diseases, 21 U.S.C. §360n. 
 In addition to these mechanisms, a new class to reward investments is under 
consideration, both internationally and domestically.  These systems involve cash 
innovation inducement prizes to stimulate investments in public health and other 
areas of public and private interest.
2 
                                                
2
  See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D 
for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1521-24 (2007); James Love & 
Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 155 (2009); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: 
Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691(1983); Burton 
Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2003) at A21; T. 
Kalil, Hamilton Project and Brookings Institution, Prizes for Technological 
Innovation (2006); Bruce G. Charlton, Mega-Prizes in Medicine: Big Cash Awards 
May Stimulate Useful and Rapid Therapetic Innovation, 68 MEDICAL HYPOTHESES 
1-3 (2007); L. Brunt. et. al, Inducement Prizes and Innovation (2008); Selected 
Innovation and Reward Programs, KEI RESEARCH NOTES (2008); K. Davidian, 
Prizes, Prize Culture and NASA’s Centennial Challenges (2004); Julien Penin, 
Patents versus ex post rewards, 34 RESEARCH POL'Y 641 (2005); J.G. Morgan, 
Inducing Innovation Through Prizes, 3 INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, 
GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 105 (2008); W.A. Masters, Prizes for innovation in 
African agriculture (2004), http://ww.eart.columbia.edu/cgsd/prizes; Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize Fund Could 
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The World Health Organization (WHO) has called for new proposals to 
address  
de-linkage of the costs of research and developments and the price of 
health products and methods for tailoring the optimal mix of incentives 
to a particular condition or product with the objective of addressing 
diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries. Global 
strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual 
property, WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY 61.21 (2008).   
 
Such de-linkage includes the awards of prizes.  Id. at Annex, element 5.3(a).  And 
independent group of experts again endorsed this concept in an April 2012 report.  
WHO, Report of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and 
Development: Financing and Coordination: R&D to Meet Health Needs in 
Developing Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination, 
http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf. 
 This de-linkage concept has found domestic support as well.  In the 112th 
Congress, two bills were introduced in the Senate proposing large cash prizes as an 
alternative to an exclusive patent monopoly, including S.1137 and S.1138.   
Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S.1137, 112th Cong. (2011); Prize Fund for 
HIV/AIDS Act, S.1138, 112th Cong. (2011).  S.1137 would apply to all 
prescription drugs, while S.1138 would limit its application to HIV/AIDS drugs.    
                                                
Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 129 
(2006); Ron Marchant, Managing Prize Systems, 2 KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY STUDIES 
(2008); James Love, The Role of Prizes in Developing Low-Cost, Point-of-Care 
Rapid Diagnostic Tests and Better Drugs for Tuberculosis (2008), 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/Prizes/prize_tb_msf_expert_meeting.pdf.   
 14 
On May 15, 2012, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions (HELP) held a hearing on S. 1138 and as noted in testimony by 
Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, the patent system may “have adverse effects 
on innovation, because the most important input into any research is prior ideas . . . 
there is a simple way to ‘square the circle,’ which entails de-linking research and 
development incentives from drug prices, and that is precisely what S.1138 
proposed to do in the context of new medicines to treat HIV/AIDS.  It does this 
through a simple mechanism—prizes.”  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Testimony to the U.S. 
Senate HELP Committee, Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging, Hearing 
on the High Cost of High Prices for HIV/AIDS Drugs and the Prize Fund 
Alternative, available at http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stiglitz.pdf.  
 Prizes may be particularly relevant where products are not patent eligible or 
where it would be inefficient or harmful to permit enforcement of exclusive rights.  
Where unrestricted access to basic information or discoveries is critical to 
progress, patents act as a barrier and do more harm than good.  See John Sulston, 
et. al., THE COMMON THREAD (2003); Aaron S. Kesselhein, et. al., University 
Based Science and Biotechnology Products: Defining the Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property, 293 JAMA 850 (2005). 
 In the present case, patents are not an appropriate reward for investments in 
isolation of DNA.  Patents in this area are burdensome, foreclosing future research 
 15 
and development and preempting all other uses, directly contradicting the purpose 
of patents.   More viable incentives should be used to stimulate innovation.  
CONCLUSION 
  The U.S. patent system operates to provide incentives for research and 
development, but is not without its limits.  This case presents questions of 
fundamental importance to the patent system, future of research and development 
and public health.  Alternative incentive mechanisms exist to induce research and 
development in areas where a patent monopoly does not provide an appropriate 
reward.  As the Supreme Court noted in its recent decision invalidating a patent in 
Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. __ (2012), the exclusivity of a patent can “impede 
the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention,” and patents are 
thus not always appropriate rewards.  The reasoning in Prometheus applies to the 
present case and supports affirmance of the lower court decision. 
For the above-stated reasons, the Court should uphold the 2010 decision of 
the district court and find that the USPTO improperly granted the patents-at-issue.   
     Respectfully submitted, 
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